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How do financial frictions affect the response of an economy to aggregate shocks? In this paper, we
address this question, focusing on liquidity constraints and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. We consider
a search model where agents use liquid assets to smooth individual income shocks. We show that the
response of this economy to aggregate shocks depends on the rate of return on liquid assets. In economies
where liquid assets pay a low return, agents hold smaller liquid reserves and the response of the economy
tends to be larger. In this case, agents expect to be liquidity constrained and, due to a self-insurance
motive, their consumption decisions are more sensitive to changes in expected income. On the other
hand, in economies where liquid assets pay a large return, agents hold larger reserves and their consumption
decisions are more insulated from income uncertainty. Therefore, aggregate shocks tend to have larger
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In times of economic distress, the demand for liquid assets typically increases. Facing the
prospect of temporary shortfalls in revenues, agents tend to hold on to their reserves of cash,
government bonds, and other safe assets as a form of self-insurance. An observation consistent
with this type of behavior is that the precautionary motive in consumption decisions is coun-
tercyclical.1 A further symptom of a countercyclical demand for liquidity can be identiﬁed in
the path of several measures of liquidity premia.2 In extreme episodes, such as ﬁnancial market
crises, this type of behavior takes the form of an outright “ﬂight to liquidity.” What are the
aggregate implications of a countercyclical demand for liquidity? Can it amplify the response
of economic activity to exogenous shocks? In this paper, we explore these questions in a general
equilibrium model with a single liquid asset and decentralized production and exchange. We
ﬁnd that the answer depends on the total supply of liquid assets. In economies where liquid
assets are relatively abundant, a negative aggregate shock leads to a mechanical reduction in
activity, but there is no additional eﬀect due to the agents’ self-insurance motive. In economies
where, instead, liquid assets are relatively scarce, the aggregate shock has a magniﬁed eﬀect
on the economy, as agents reduce their consumption in an attempt to protect their reserves.
Our ampliﬁcation mechanism is driven by a form of complementarity in trading decisions.
An agent is less willing to spend his liquid assets when he expects other agents to spend less.
This happens because, in that case, it is harder for him to rebuild his reserves by selling goods
to other agents. The idea that “the diﬃculty of coordination of trade” may contribute to
aggregate volatility goes back, at least, to Diamond (1982, 1984). The contribution of our
paper is to show that the presence of this coordination problem depends in a crucial way on
the supply of liquid assets. In particular, when they are relatively abundant, the coordination
element vanishes.
We consider a model of decentralized trade in the tradition of search models of money.
There is a large number of households, each with one consumer and one producer. Consumers
and producers from diﬀerent households meet and trade in spatially separated islands. In each
island the gains from trade are determined by a local productivity shock. Agents make their
trading decisions (consumption and production) without observing the shock realized in the
island visited by their partners. Our focus is on whether trading decisions in a given island
1See Parker and Preston (2005).
2See Krishnamurthy (2002) and Longstaﬀ (2004) and papers reviewed in Cochrane (2005).
1are aﬀected by agents’ expectations regarding the level of trading in other islands. This is the
sense in which there is a “coordination problem” in our model.
Agents are anonymous and, thus, credit arrangements are not feasible. The government
issues a ﬁxed supply of interest-bearing notes, “money,” which are used for transactions. These
notes pay a constant interest rate which is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation. As we will see,
the equilibrium value of real money balances is an increasing function of the rate of return
chosen by the government. Therefore, a regime with a high rate of return, is labeled a regime
of “abundant liquidity,” while one with a low rate of return is one of “scarce liquidity.” To
derive our main analytical results, we focus on two extreme cases. In the ﬁrst one, the rate of
return is equal to the inverse of the agents’ discount factor. This is a “Friedman rule” regime
and, in this case, real balances are large and the economy achieves the ﬁrst-best allocation. In
the second one, the rate of return and the value of real balances are so low that agents expect
to be liquidity constrained for any realization of the idiosyncratic shocks. We refer to this case
as a “fully constrained” regime.
Our ﬁrst result is that under the Friedman rule the quantity traded in each island is indepen-
dent of what happens in other islands. This result follows from an assumption of separability
in preferences and from the fact that, in the Friedman rule regime, agents are fully insured
against idiosyncratic shocks. This makes the marginal value of money constant, allowing the
consumer and the producer from the same household to make their trading decisions indepen-
dently. Away from the Friedman rule, instead, the decisions of the two agents are linked. The
consumer needs to forecast the earnings of the producer to evaluate the household’s marginal
value of money, while the producer needs to forecast the consumer’s outlays.
Next, we look at the aggregate implications of these “linkages.” We consider an aggregate
shock which shifts the distribution of island-speciﬁc productivities, reducing the probability of
low realizations and increasing that of high realizations (a ﬁrst-order stochastic increase). The
aggregate shock is publicly observed. Under both regimes, there is a positive compositional
eﬀect: as more islands have high productivity, aggregate output increases. However, in the
Friedman rule regime, there is no feedback from this aggregate increase in output to the level
o ft r a d i n gi na ni s l a n dw i t hagiven local shock. In the fully constrained regime, instead,
the linkage between the trading decisions in diﬀerent islands generates an additional eﬀect on
trading and output. A good aggregate shock increases the probability of high earnings for the
producer. This induces the consumer to increase spending and reduce the household’s liquid
2reserves. At the same time, the producer expects his partner to spend more, and this increases
his incentive to produce. These two eﬀects imply that a higher level of aggregate activity
induces higher levels of activity in each individual island. This increase is further magniﬁed
once we take into account general equilibrium eﬀects. Using a simple calibrated version of our
economy, we show that this leads to a sizeable degree of ampliﬁcation of aggregate shocks.
The crucial diﬀerence between the two ﬁnancial regimes is the role of expectations in the
trading decisions of individual agents. To further clarify this diﬀerence, we also consider the
case where the aggregate distribution of island-speciﬁc shocks is not perfectly known at the
beginning of each period, and agents observe a public signal regarding this distribution. In the
Friedman rule regime, the public signal has no eﬀect on aggregate activity, given that trading
decisions are solely based on local shocks, which are observable. In the fully constrained regime,
on the other hand, a favorable public signal tends to increase aggregate activity due to the
eﬀect of the signal on agents’ expectations.
This paper is related to the vast literature on search models of money, going back to
Diamond (1984) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). In particular, our model allows for divisible
money and we use the Lagos and Wright (2005) approach to simplify the analysis. In Lagos
and Wright (2005) agents alternate trading in a decentralized market to trading in a centralized
competitive market. The combination of quasi-linear preferences and a periodic access to a
centralized market ensures that the distribution of money holdings across agents is degenerate
when they enter the decentralized market. Here we use these same two ingredients, with a
modiﬁed periodic structure. In our model, agents have access to a centralized market every
three periods. The extra period of decentralized trading is necessary to make the self-insurance
motive matter for trading decisions in the decentralized market of the previous period. This is
at the core of our ampliﬁcation mechanism. A three-period structure is also used by Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2005) to study the short-run neutrality of money. They show that, away
from the Friedman rule, random monetary injections can be non-neutral, since they have a
diﬀerential eﬀect on agents with heterogeneous money holdings. Although very diﬀerent in the
objective, their analysis also relies on the lack of consumption insurance. Finally, our model
is related to Rocheteau and Wright (2005) for the use of competitive pricing àl aLucas and
Prescott (1974) in a search model of money.
The paper is also related to the large literature exploring the relation between ﬁnancial fric-
tions and aggregate volatility, including Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bencivenga and Smith
3(1991), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In particular, Kiyotaki and
Moore (2001) also address this issue from the point of view of limited liquidity supply. Their
paper emphasizes a diﬀerent channel by which limited liquidity can aﬀect the transmission of
aggregate shocks, focusing on the eﬀects on investment and capital accumulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our environment
and solve for the ﬁrst-best allocation of resources. In Section 3,w ed e ﬁne and characterize
the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 addresses the main question of the paper, that is, how
the economy reacts to an aggregate shock. Section 5 present some numerical exercises on the
ampliﬁcation result and on the behavior of liquidity premia. Section 6 discusses the extension
with imperfect information and public signals and versions of the model with alternative sources
of liquidity supply. Section 7 concludes. The appendix contains all the proofs not in the text.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households, composed of two
agents, a consumer and a producer. Each household has an initial endowment M of perfectly
divisible notes issued by the government, “money.” Time is discrete and each period agents
produce and consume a single, perishable consumption good. The economy has a simple
periodic structure: each time period t is divided into three sub-periods, s =1 ,2,3. We will
call them “periods,” whenever there is no risk of confusion.
In periods 1 and 2, the consumer and the producer from each household travel to spatially
separated markets, or islands, where they interact with consumers and producers from other
households. Each island has a competitive market, as in Lucas and Prescott (1974). Trading
is characterized by anonymity, therefore the only type of trades that are feasible are spot
exchanges of goods for money. There is a continuum of islands and each island receives the same
mass of consumers and producers in both periods 1 and 2. The assignment of agents to islands
is random and satisﬁes a law of large numbers, so that each island receives a representative
sample of consumers and producers. The consumer and the producer from the same household
do not communicate during periods 1 and 2. However, at the end of each period, they meet
and share money holdings and information. In period 3, all consumers and producers trade in
a single centralized market.
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. It is realized after producers and consumers have reached island k and
is observed only by the agents in the island. A law of large numbers applies, so F(·) also
represents the distribution of productivity shocks across islands. It will be useful to assume
that F(·) has an atom at 0,i . e . ,F (0) > 0, and is continuous on (0,θ]. For the moment, we
look at an economy with no aggregate shocks. In Section 4, we will introduce aggregate shocks
by allowing for shifts in the distribution F(·).
In periods 2 and 3, the producer of household j has a ﬁxed endowment of consumption
goods, y
j
2,t = e2 and y
j
3,t = e3. We will assume that the value of e3 is large, so as to ensure
that equilibrium consumption in period 3 is strictly positive for all households.




















s,t is consumption in period (s,t) and β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. The functions
u and U are increasing and strictly concave, and the function v, representing the disutility of
eﬀort, is increasing and convex. All of them have continuous ﬁrst and second derivatives. A
number of other assumptions will be useful in the analysis. Both u and U satisfy standard
Inada conditions and v satisﬁes the condition limn→¯ n v0 (n)=∞. The function u is bounded
below, with u(0) = 0,a n dt h e r ei saσ > 0 such that −u00 (c)c/u0 (c) ∈ [σ,1) for all c ≥ 0.
Finally, the function U satisﬁes −U00 (c)c/U0 (c) ≤ 1 for all c ≥ 0.W ew i l ld i s c u s st h er o l eo f
these assumptions when they are needed in the analysis.
The fact that in period 3 consumers and producers trade in a centralized market and
have linear utility is essential for tractability. This allows us to derive an equilibrium with a
degenerate distribution of money balances at the beginning of period (1,t), as in Lagos and
Wright (2005).3
Finally, we need to specify the monetary regime. At the end of each period 3,t h eg o v e r n -
ment levies a lump-sum tax T and pays a (gross) rate of return R on the net money balances
3See Shi (1997) for a diﬀerent approach to obtain a degenerate distribution of money holdings.
5held by each household. In order to focus on equilibria with stationary nominal prices, we
focus on regimes with constant money supply M. We characterize a monetary regime using
the two parameters R and M,a n ds e tT so as to satisfy the government budget constraint
M = R(M − T).
In this paper, we make no attempt to explain the government’s choice of the monetary regime,
but we simply explore the eﬀect of diﬀerent regimes on equilibrium behavior.
Notice that we allow for R S 1.4 The assumption of interest-paying money balances is a
general way of introducing a government-supplied liquid asset. In the case R>1 the asset
resembles a nominal government bond, while in the case R<1 it looks more like money
subject to a positive inﬂation tax. In Section 6.2, we discuss a number of alternative ways of
interpreting the liquid asset in our model.
2.1 First-best allocation
The ﬁrst-best allocation provides a useful benchmark for the rest of the analysis. Consider a
social planner who can choose the labor eﬀort and the consumption of the households. Given
that there is no capital, there is no real intertemporal link between periods. Therefore, we can
look at a static planner problem which only includes periods s =1 ,2,3.
Each household is characterized by a pair (θ,˜ θ),w h e r et h eﬁrst element represents the
shock in the producer’s island and the second represents the one in the consumer’s island. An
allocation is given by consumption functions {cs(θ,˜ θ)}s∈{1,2,3} and an eﬀort function n(θ,˜ θ).







u(c1(θ,˜ θ)) − v(n(θ,˜ θ)) + U(c2(θ,˜ θ)) + c3(θ,˜ θ)
´
dF (θ)dF(˜ θ),













cs(θ,˜ θ)dF (θ)dF(˜ θ) ≤ es.
4When R<1, T is negative and corresponds to a lump-sum subsidy.
5From now on, “island θ” is short for “an island with productivity shock θ.”
6T h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t sf o rp e r i o d s1 and 2 reﬂect the assumption that each island receives a
representative sample of consumers and producers.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal allocation.
Proposition 1 The optimal allocation in period 1 is given by n(θ,˜ θ)=nFB(θ) and c1(˜ θ,θ)=
y1(θ,˜ θ)=yFB
1 (θ) for all (θ,˜ θ) ∈ Θ2,w h e r eyFB










1 (θ)=θnFB(θ), for all θ ∈ Θ. Optimal consumption in period 2 is c2(θ,˜ θ)=e2 for all
(θ,˜ θ) ∈ Θ2.
Due to the separability of the utility function, the optimal labor eﬀort of a producer located
in island θ depends only on the productivity θ and is not aﬀected by the shock of any other
island. Furthermore, it is easy to show that output is greater in islands with larger θ.T h e s e
two results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The ﬁrst-best level of output in island θ, yFB
1 (θ), is independent of the economy-
wide distribution of productivity shocks F(·). The function yFB
1 (θ) is increasing in θ.
Moreover, notice that, at the optimum, c2 is constant across households, that is, households
are fully insured against the shocks θ and ˜ θ. Finally, given linearity, the consumption levels
in period 3 are not pinned down, as consumers are indiﬀerent among any proﬁle c3(θ,˜ θ),w i t h
E[c3(θ,˜ θ)] = e3.
3 Equilibrium
We turn now to the deﬁnition and characterization of the competitive equilibrium. We con-
centrate on steady-state equilibria where prices, the allocation and the distribution of money
are independent of time. Hence, from now on we drop the time index t.
We begin by characterizing optimal individual behavior for given prices. Money is the
numeraire, p1 (θ) denotes the price of goods in period 1 in island θ,a n dp2 and p3 denote
the prices in periods 2 and 3.C o n s i d e rah o u s e h o l dw i t ha ni n i t i a ls t o c ko fm o n e ym at the
beginning of period 1. The consumer travels to island ˜ θ and consumes c1(˜ θ).S i n c e m o n e y
7holdings are non-negative, his budget constraint and liquidity constraint in period 1 are
m1(˜ θ)+p1(˜ θ)c1(˜ θ) ≤ m,
m1(˜ θ) ≥ 0,
where m1(˜ θ) denotes the consumer’s money holdings at the end of period 1.I nt h em e a n t i m e ,
the producer, located in island θ, produces and sells y1 (θ)=θn(θ).A t t h ee n d o f p e r i o d 1,
the consumer and the producer get back together, and pool their money holdings. Therefore,
in period 2 the consumer’s constraints are
m2(θ,˜ θ)+p2c2(θ,˜ θ) ≤ m1(˜ θ)+p1 (θ)θn(θ),
m2(θ,˜ θ) ≥ 0,
where consumption, c2(θ,˜ θ), and end-of-period money holdings, m2(θ,˜ θ), are now contingent
on both shocks θ and ˜ θ. Finally, in period 3, the consumer and the producer are located in the
same island and the revenues p3e3 are immediately available. Moreover, the household has to
pay the nominal tax T. The constraints are now
m3(θ,˜ θ)+p3c3(θ,˜ θ) ≤ m2(θ,˜ θ)+p2e2 + p3e3 − T,
m3(θ,˜ θ) ≥ 0.
Let V (m) denote the expected utility of a household with nominal balances m at the
beginning of period 1, facing prices {p1 (θ)}θ∈Θ ,p 2,p 3 in all periods. The household’s problem
is then characterized by the Bellman equation






[u(c1(˜ θ)) − v(n(θ)) + U(c2(θ,˜ θ)) + (2)
+c3(θ,˜ θ)+βV(Rm3(θ,˜ θ))]dF(θ)dF(˜ θ),
subject to the budget constraints and liquidity constraints introduced above. The solution to
this problem gives us optimal quantities as a function of the initial money balances m,w h i c h
we denote by c1(θ,m), c2(θ,˜ θ,m),e t c .
We are now in a position to deﬁne a steady-state competitive equilibrium, where prices,
quantities and the distribution of money balances are stationary.
Deﬁnition 1 A steady-state competitive equilibrium is given by prices
©
{p1 (θ)}θ∈Θ ,p 2,p 3
ª
,
a distribution of money holdings with c.d.f. H (·) and support M, and an allocation {n(θ,m),
c1(θ,m),c 2(θ,˜ θ,m),c 3(θ,˜ θ,m),m 1 (θ,m),m 2(θ,˜ θ,m),m 3(θ,˜ θ,m)}θ∈Θ,˜ θ∈Θ,m∈M such that:














cs(θ,˜ θ,m)dF(˜ θ)dF(θ)dH (m)=es for s =2 ,3;







{ ˜ m:Rm3(θ,˜ θ,˜ m)≤m}
dF(˜ θ)dF(θ)dH (˜ m).
Condition (iii) ensures that the distribution H (·) is stationary. As we will see below, we
can focus on equilibria where the distribution of money balances is degenerate at m = M.
Therefore, from now on we drop the argument m from the equilibrium allocations.
In order to characterize the equilibrium behavior, it is useful to derive the household’s











(m2(θ,˜ θ) ≥ 0) for all (θ,˜ θ) ∈ Θ2, (4)
1 ≥ p3βRV 0(Rm3(θ,˜ θ)) (m3(θ,˜ θ) ≥ 0) for all (θ,˜ θ) ∈ Θ2, (5)
the optimality condition for labor supply





U0(c2(θ,˜ θ))dF(˜ θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, (6)







Our assumptions allow us to simplify the equilibrium characterization as follows. First, the
assumption that F(·) has an atom at 0, together with the Inada condition for U,i m p l i e st h a t
m1(˜ θ) > 0 for all ˜ θ. All consumers keep some positive money reserves in period 1, to insure
6The market clearing conditions reﬂect the assumption that each island receive a representative sample of
consumers and producers. Thanks to Walras’ law we can omit the market clearing conditions for the money
market.
9against the risk that their producers make zero revenues. This guarantees that condition (3)
a l w a y sh o l d sa sa ne q u a l i t y . 7
Next, condition (5) shows why we obtain equilibria with a degenerate distribution of money
balances, as in Lagos and Wright (2005). Given that the supply of money is constant at M,a
steady state equilibrium with a degenerate distribution H (·) must satisfy
Rm3(θ,˜ θ)=M for all (θ,˜ θ) ∈ Θ2.
In equilibrium, all agents adjust their consumption in period 3, so as to reach the same level of
m3, irrespective of their current shocks. This immediately implies that m3(θ,˜ θ) > 0,s ot h a t
(5) holds as an equality for all pairs (θ,˜ θ). Notice that the assumptions that utility is linear
in period 3 and that e3 is large are crucial to ensure that the left-hand side of (5) is constant,
conﬁrming that this behavior is optimal.8
This leaves us with condition (4). In general, this condition can be either binding or slack
for diﬀerent pairs (θ,˜ θ), depending on the parameters of the model. However, we are able to
give a full characterization of the equilibrium by looking at speciﬁc monetary regimes, namely,
by making assumptions about the rate of return R. First, we look at equilibria where the
liquidity constraint m2(θ,˜ θ) ≥ 0 is never binding. We will show that this case arises when
R =1 /β, that is, in a monetary regime that follows the Friedman rule. Second, we look at
equilibria where the constraint m2(θ,˜ θ) ≥ 0 is binding for all pairs (θ,˜ θ). We will show that
this case arises whenever the rate of return is suﬃciently low, i.e., when R ≤ ˆ R,f o rag i v e n
cutoﬀ ˆ R ∈ (0,1/β).
These two polar cases provide two analytically tractable benchmarks, which illustrate well
the mechanism at the core of our model. The quantitative analysis in Section 5 also considers
the case of economies with R ∈ ( ˆ R,1/β), where the liquidity constraint in period 2 is binding
for a subset of agents.
3.1 Unconstrained equilibrium
We begin by considering “unconstrained equilibria,” that is, equilibria where the liquidity
constraint is never binding. In this case, condition (4) always holds as an equality. Combining
7In Section 5.2 and in Appendix B, we relax the assumption F (0) > 0.
8When R<1/β, all steady-state equilibria are characterized by a degenerate distribution of money holdings.
One can show that, in this case, the value function V is strictly concave in any steady-state equilibrium. This,
together with (5) implies that m3 is constant across households.









Taking expectations with respect to ˜ θ on both sides, shows that a necessary condition to
obtain an unconstrained equilibrium is βR =1 . The following proposition shows that, indeed,
βR =1is both necessary and suﬃcient for an unconstrained equilibrium. Moreover, under
this monetary regime the equilibrium achieves an eﬃcient allocation.9
Proposition 2 An unconstrained equilibrium exists if and only if R =1 /β and achieves a
ﬁrst-best allocation. In all unconstrained equilibria, the prices are
p1(θ)=κu0(yFB
1 (θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ, (9)
p2 = κU0(e2), (10)
p3 = κ, (11)







To capture the logic behind the eﬃciency result, consider a consumer and a producer
located in island θ. Using condition (4) and market clearing, we can rewrite the consumer’s















These two equations describe, respectively, the demand and the supply of consumption goods
on island θ, as a function of the price p1(θ). Jointly, they determine the equilibrium values of
p1(θ) and y1(θ).
Conditions (13) and (14) highlight that, under the Friedman rule, a consumer and a pro-
ducer in island θ do not need to forecast the income/spending of their partners when making
9See Rocheteau and Wright (2005) for a general discussion of the eﬃciency of the Friedman rule in a wide
class of search models of money.
10Whenever we look at a consumer and producer located in the same island θ, the consumer’s optimality
conditions are given by (3)-(5), with the role of θ and ˜ θ inverted.
11their trading decisions, given that their marginal value of money is constant and equal to 1/p3.
This implies that trading in island θ is essentially independent of trading decisions in all other
islands. We will see that this is no longer true when we move to a constrained equilibrium.
Conditions (13) and (14) can be easily manipulated to obtain the planner’s ﬁrst order condi-
tion (1).
It is possible to prove that the unconstrained equilibrium allocation is unique, but the
price levels are indeterminate, since κ in (9)-(11) can be anywhere in the interval (0, ˆ κ].11
This implies that the real value of the money supply M is indeterminate. However, the upper
bound ˆ κ determines a lower bound for the real value of M. In particular, given our focus
on the liquidity constraint in period 2, we derive explicitly the upper bound for M/p2 in the
following corollary.








The fact that real value of money is large in period 2 ensures that all households can aﬀord
to consume c2(θ,˜ θ)=e2, irrespective of the shocks θ and ˜ θ, thus achieving full insurance.
3.2 Fully constrained equilibrium
We now turn to the case where the liquidity constraint is always binding in period 2,t h a ti s ,
m2(θ,˜ θ)=0for all pairs (θ,˜ θ). The following proposition shows that this type of equilibrium
arises when R is suﬃciently low. We refer to it as a “fully constrained equilibrium.”
Proposition 3 There is a cutoﬀ ˆ R ∈ (0,1/β) such that a fully constrained equilibrium exists
if and only if R ≤ ˆ R.
Let us illustrate the main steps of the equilibrium construction. Combining the consumer’s











where we use the fact that all agents begin period 1 with m = M and end period 2 with
m2(θ,˜ θ)=0 . Notice that now households are not fully insured and their consumption in
period 2 depends both on the consumer’s and on the producer’s shock in period 1.
11This indeterminacy can be eliminated using a “ﬁscal rule” under which the government commits to set the
real value of the lump sum tax T/p3.
12Integrating both sides of (16) over θ and ˜ θ, and using market clearing in periods 1 and 2,
we obtain a simple “quantity-theory” equation
p2e2 = M. (17)
It is easy to show that in any equilibrium the choice of M only aﬀects nominal variables, but
has no real eﬀect. Therefore, we choose the convenient normalization M = e2,w h i c h ,i naf u l l y
constrained equilibrium, implies p2 =1 .
As in the unconstrained case, let us focus on a consumer and a producer in island θ.T h e
previous steps imply that we can rewrite the consumer’s Euler equation (3) as





e2 − p1 (θ)y1 (θ)+p1(˜ θ)y1(˜ θ)
´
dF(˜ θ), (18)











e2 − p1(˜ θ)y1(˜ θ)+p1 (θ)y1 (θ)
´
dF(˜ θ). (19)
The demand and supply equations (18) and (19) correspond to (13) and (14) in the uncon-
strained case and show that the equilibrium values of p1 (θ) and y1 (θ) are now dependent
on prices and quantities in all other islands. This highlights the “linkages” between trading
decisions in island θ and trading decisions in other islands, which arise when liquidity con-
straints are binding in period 2. In this case, consumers and producers need to forecast the
level of trading in other islands to evaluate their expected marginal value of money, and thus
their willingness to trade at each price p1(θ). These linkages will play a crucial role when we
introduce aggregate shocks in the next section.
Equations (18) and (19) deﬁne two functional equations in p1 (·) and y1 (·). In the proof
of Proposition 3, we show that this pair of functional equations has a unique solution. To
do so, we deﬁne x(θ) ≡ p1(θ)y1(θ) and we analyze a ﬁxed point problem in terms of the
function x(·).T h eﬁxed point is found using a contraction mapping argument. Here we make
use of the assumption that the elasticity of u0 (c) is bounded in [σ,1). Proposition 3 can be
proved under weaker conditions, using a diﬀerent type of ﬁxed point theorem. However, the
contraction mapping approach laid out here will be essential in deriving our ampliﬁcation result
in Section 4. An interesting corollary of Proposition 3 is that the fully constrained equilibrium
allocation is the same for all R ≤ ˆ R. The only equilibrium variable that changes with R is the
price level p3.
13The following lemma establishes two monotonicity results for real and nominal income in
period 1, which will be useful in studying the eﬀects of aggregate shocks.
Lemma 2 In a fully constrained equilibrium, both y1(θ) and p1(θ)y1(θ) are monotone increas-
ing in θ.
Finally, comparing (15) and (17) shows that real money supply in period 2 is smaller in
the fully constrained equilibrium than in any unconstrained equilibrium. The intuition behind
this result is that a lower rate of return on money reduces agents’ incentive to save. This tends
to increase nominal prices and reduces the equilibrium value of real money balances. This
result also explains why we label the monetary regime with R ≤ ˆ R as one of “scarce liquidity,”
and the Friedman rule regime as one of “abundant liquidity.” We will return to this issue in
Section 6.2.
3.3 Liquidity premium
Let us extend our model by introducing an illiquid asset in zero net supply. This simple
extension allows us to deﬁne a liquidity premium. The illiquid asset is traded at the beginning
of period 1, before the idiosyncratic shocks θ are realized, and it represents a claim to 1 unit
of money in period 3. It is illiquid in the sense that it cannot be carried by consumers to the
islands they visit in periods 1 and 2.D e n o t eb yq its price in terms of money (the numeraire).
Households choose illiquid asset holdings b at the beginning of period 1 and their budget
constraints in periods 1 and 3 become
m1(˜ θ)+p1(˜ θ)c1(˜ θ) ≤ m − qb,
m3(θ,˜ θ)+p3c3(θ,˜ θ) ≤ m2(θ,˜ θ)+p2e2 + p3e3 + b − T,












V 0 (Rm3)dF(θ)dF(˜ θ).
Combining it with the envelope condition (7), we obtain
q = βR. (20)
Since the illiquid asset is in zero net supply, the equilibrium analysis is unchanged.
14Notice that the gross nominal return on money between periods 1 and 3 is 1,w h i l et h a t
on the illiquid asset is equal to 1/q. Hence, 1/q − 1 represents the liquidity premium in our
economy. It follows from (20) that, under the Friedman rule, q =1and the liquidity premium
is zero. In this case, the return on the illiquid asset is exactly the same as that of the liquid
asset because agents are perfectly insured. Whenever R<1/β, the liquidity premium is
positive. In particular, in a fully constrained economy, the liquidity premium is above some
cutoﬀ 1/(β ˆ R) − 1. Agents are all liquidity constrained in period 2 and are willing to pay a
lower price for the illiquid asset, because they are concerned about consumption volatility in
period 2, when the illiquid asset cannot be used.
4A g g r e g a t e S h o c k s
We now turn to the main question of the paper: how does output respond to aggregate shocks
when liquidity is scarce or abundant? In this section, we compare analytically the eﬀect of
an aggregate shock in the unconstrained and fully constrained regimes derived above and we
identify an ampliﬁcation mechanism which is only present in the fully constrained case. In
the next section, we will present numerical examples in order to evaluate the quantitative
signiﬁcance of the ampliﬁcation eﬀect and to study the intermediate cases with R ∈ ( ˆ R,1/β).
4.1 A decomposition
First, we introduce aggregate uncertainty in the model by introducing an aggregate shock ζt,
which is realized and publicly revealed at the beginning of each period. We assume that ζt is
i.i.d. with cumulative distribution function G(·) continuous on the support [ζ,ζ]. Conditional
on ζt, the cross-sectional distribution of the productivity shocks θk
t is F (·|ζt). Assume that
F (θ|ζ) is continuous and non-increasing in ζ,f o re a c hθ. This implies that a distribution with
ah i g h e rζ ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates a distribution with lower ζ.
We assume i.i.d. aggregate shocks and we focus on simple stationary equilibria, deﬁned
along the lines of Deﬁnition 1, where the distribution of money balances at the beginning of
period 1 is degenerate. Prices and allocations now depend not only on the current idiosyncratic
shocks, but also on the current aggregate shock ζ, and are denoted by p1(θ,ζ), c1(θ,ζ), etc.
In Appendix B we present the characterization of the equilibrium with aggregate shocks. In
particular, both propositions 2 and 3 are easily extended to this case. The only noticeable
15diﬀerence is that the deﬁnition of the cutoﬀ ˆ R needs to be modiﬁed so as to ensure that in a
fully constrained equilibrium agents are constrained for all realizations of ζ.
Given that output in periods 2 and 3 is exogenous, we focus on aggregate output in period 1,




y1 (θ,ζ)dF (θ|ζ). (21)
In particular, we look at the proportional response of output to a small aggregate shock,
















The ﬁrst member on the right-hand side represents the mechanical eﬀect of having a larger
number of islands with high productivity. This eﬀect is positive both in the unconstrained and
in the fully constrained economy, given that output is increasing in θ i nb o t hr e g i m e sa ss h o w n
by Lemmas 1 and 2. We call this the “own-productivity eﬀect.” The second member captures
the endogenous response of output for each given level of θ, and is at the core of our analysis.
We call it the “expected income eﬀect,” for reasons that will be apparent below.
4.2 The expected income eﬀect
Consider ﬁrst an unconstrained equilibrium. In this case, the economy achieves the ﬁrst-best
allocation and, as we know from Lemma 1, output in island θ is independent of the economy-
wide distribution of productivity. Therefore, ∂y1 (θ,ζ)/∂ζ =0and the expected income eﬀect
is absent.
Next, consider the case of a fully constrained equilibrium. The following proposition shows
that, in this case, output in each island is increasing in ζ, for any given realization of the local
productivity shock θ. This implies that the expected income eﬀect is positive.
Proposition 4 Consider a fully constrained equilibrium of the economy with aggregate shocks.
For each θ>0,t h eo u t p u ty1 (θ,ζ) is increasing in ζ.
To understand the mechanism behind this eﬀect, it is useful to consider the following
partial equilibrium exercise. Let us focus on island θ and take as given p1(˜ θ,ζ) and y1(˜ θ,ζ)
for all ˜ θ 6= θ. Rewriting the demand and supply equations (18) and (19) for the economy with
16aggregate shocks gives
u0(y1(θ,ζ)) = p1 (θ,ζ)
Z θ
0









U0(c2(θ,˜ θ,ζ))dF(˜ θ|ζ), (24)
where
c2(˜ θ,θ,ζ)=e2 − p1 (θ,ζ)y1 (θ,ζ)+p1(˜ θ,ζ)y1(˜ θ,ζ),
and the symmetric expression holds for c2(˜ θ,θ,ζ). Lemma 2 shows that p1 (θ,ζ)y1 (θ,ζ) is an
increasing function of θ. It follows that U0(c2(˜ θ,θ;ζ)) is decreasing in ˜ θ,w h i l eU0(c2(θ,˜ θ;ζ)) is
increasing in ˜ θ. Hence, when ζ increases the integral on the right-hand side of (23) decreases,
while the integral on the right-hand side of (24) increases.12 On the demand side, the intuition
is that when a liquidity constrained consumer expects higher income from his partner, his
marginal value of money decreases. Then, he reduces his reserves and increases consumption
for any given price p1(θ). On the supply side, when a producer expects higher spending by his
partner, he faces a negative income eﬀect and, hence produces more for any given p1(θ).T h e
ﬁrst eﬀect shifts the demand curve to the right, the second shifts the supply curve to the right.
The combination of the two implies that equilibrium output in island θ increases.
On top of this partial equilibrium mechanism, there is a general equilibrium feed-back due
to the endogenous response of prices and quantities in the islands ˜ θ 6= θ. This magniﬁes the
initial eﬀect. As the nominal value of output in all other islands increases, there is a further
increase in the marginal value of money for the consumers and a further decrease for the
producers, leading to an additional increase in output.
Summing up, the mechanism identiﬁed in Proposition 4 tends to magnify the output re-
sponse to aggregate shocks in a fully constrained economy. This ampliﬁcation eﬀect is driven
by the agents’ expectations regarding nominal income in other islands.
Notice that the proof of Proposition 4 is the only place where we use the assumption that
the elasticity of U0 (c) i ss m a l l e ro re q u a lt h a n1. In particular, this condition is suﬃcient to
establish that the labor supply in each island is positively sloped, which, in turns, is suﬃcient
to obtain our result. When we turn to numerical examples, we will see that the result survives
for elasticities larger than 1.
12Recall that an increase in ζ leads to a shift of the distribution of θ in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance.
17Going back to equation (22), we have established that the expected income eﬀect is zero
in the unconstrained case and positive in the constrained one. However, this is not suﬃcient
to establish that output volatility is greater in the constrained economy, since we have not yet
compared the relative magnitude of the own-productivity eﬀects, which are positive in both
cases. A special example where the comparison is unambiguous is the case of a binary shock
for θ, where the own-productivity eﬀect is identical in the two cases.
Let θ have a binary distribution on {0,θ}.L e t ζ ∈ [0,1] represent the probability of the
high realization θ. In this case, the output response to a positive aggregate shock is always
higher when liquidity is scarce.
Lemma 3 When θ has a binary distribution on {0,θ} the response of output to the aggregate
shock ζ, dlnY1/dζ, is greater in a fully constrained equilibrium relative to an unconstrained
equilibrium.
Consider ﬁrst an unconstrained equilibrium and let yU
1 denote output in island θ. Output
is zero in the island where θ =0 . Moreover, from Lemma 1 we know that yU is independent







Next, consider a fully constrained equilibrium and let yC
1 (ζ) denote output in island θ.A g g r e -
gate output is now equal to Y1 (ζ)=ζyC











The second element on the right-hand side of (26) is positive by Proposition 4. Therefore,
comparing (25) and (26) immediately shows that the output response is larger in the fully
constrained economy.
Apart from speciﬁc examples, it is generally diﬃcult to compare the relative size of the
own-productivity eﬀect in the two regimes. In fact, it is possible to construct examples where
this eﬀect is larger in the unconstrained economy and where it is strong enough to dominate
the expected income eﬀect. Therefore, to evaluate the signiﬁcance of the mechanism identiﬁed
in Proposition 4, we turn to a basic quantitative exercise.
185 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present some numerical examples that show that, under reasonable para-
metrizations, the ampliﬁcation eﬀect identiﬁed above is sizeable and leads to higher volatility
in economies with lower supply of liquid assets. To compute these examples, we generalize
our theory to monetary regimes with R ∈ ( ˆ R,1/β), where the liquidity constraint is binding
for a subset of realizations (θ,˜ θ). The characterization of the equilibrium for this intermediate
region is in Appendix B.
5.1 Parameters
We interpret each sequence of three sub-periods as a year, and set the discount factor β equal
to 0.96. The instantaneous utility functions in periods 1 and 2 are u(c)=c1−σ1/(1 − σ1)
and U (c)=c1−σ2/(1 − σ2). The disutility of labor eﬀort is linear, v(n)=n. The island
speciﬁcs h o c kθ has a discrete uniform distribution, with 10 equally spaced realizations on the
interval [0,θ].
Given isoelastic preferences, it is possible to show that if θ,e2, and e3 are scaled by appro-
priate factors, one obtains equilibria which are equivalent in terms of all the measures we will
look at (output volatility, nominal incomes, etc). Therefore, we normalize e2 =1 .
The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ2 is set equal to 1. The parameters σ1 and e3
are chosen to obtain a realistic economy-wide demand for the liquid asset. In particular,
we interpret the liquid asset in a narrow sense as money balances (M1, i.e., currency and
demand deposits) and match the empirical relation between money velocity and the nominal
interest rate. This approach makes our simple calibration comparable to those in Lagos and
Wright (2005) and Craig and Rocheteau (2007), which, in turns, follow Lucas (2000). In the
data, money velocity is deﬁned as the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP and the nominal interest
rate is measured by the short-term commercial paper rate. In the model, money velocity is
measured as M/
³R θ
0 p1 (θ)y1 (θ)dF(θ)+p2e2 + p3e3
´
.13 To derive the nominal interest rate
in the model, we use a result derived in Section 6.2, which shows that our model is equivalent
to a model with non-interest-bearing money, where money growth and inﬂation are constant
and equal to γ. In that setup, the real rate of return on money balances is equal to R =1 /γ,
the inverse of the inﬂation rate, and the real rate of return on the illiquid asset (treasury
13For simplicity, we calibrate parameters using the model with no aggregate shock.

























Figure 1: Money velocity and nominal interest rates
bills) is equal to 1/β. Therefore, the nominal interest rate is equal to 1+i = γ/β =( βR)
−1.
This shows that the Friedman rule regime corresponds, as it should, to i =0 , while a fully
constrained regime corresponds to i>ˆ ı,w h e r eˆ ı =( β ˆ R)−1 − 1.14
Finally, the value of θ is chosen so that average nominal income is equal in periods 1 and
2,t h a ti s ,
R θ
0 p1(θ)y1(θ)dF(θ)=p2e2, in a baseline scenario where the nominal interest rate is
i =5 % . The parameters we obtain are σ1 =0 .294, e3 =9 .021,a n dθ =1 .904.F i g u r e1s h o w s
the relation between money velocity and the nominal interest rate in the data (scatter plot)
and in the model (solid line).
5.2 Ampliﬁcation
We can now illustrate the main result of the paper, by looking at the eﬀect of aggregate shocks
in economies with diﬀerent levels of i (or R). We consider a positive aggregate shock that
reduces the probability of θ =0by 0.009 and increases proportionally the probability of all
positive realizations of θ. If we interpret θ =0as an unemployment state, this shock reduces its
probability from 0.10 to 0.091. The size of the aggregate shock is chosen so that it increases Y1
14For each value of i in the empirical time-series, we evaluate the equilibrium value of money velocity. We
choose σ1 and e3 to minimize the quadratic distance between money velocity in the data and the model-generated
series. We use US annual data for the sample period 1900-2000, as in Lucas (2000).













 Fully constrained equilibrium
Figure 2: The aggregate output response in diﬀerent regimes
by 1% under the Friedman rule. The equilibrium is computed assuming that the two aggregate
shocks have equal probability.
Figure 2 shows the proportional response of Y1 for diﬀerent levels of the nominal interest
rate i. Notice that the output response is about three times larger in the fully constrained
economy, that is, when i ≥ ˆ ı (R ≤ ˆ R), relative to the Friedman rule regime, where i =0
(R =1 /β). In the parametrization presented, the fully constrained regime is achieved for high
levels of i, around 90%–basically an hyperinﬂation scenario. However, a sizeable ampliﬁcation
eﬀect is also present for moderate inﬂation rates. For example, when the nominal interest rate
is 15% the output response is more than 40% larger than under the Friedman rule.
Figure 3 illustrates the expected income eﬀect identiﬁed in Proposition 4. The two panels
illustrate how output varies across islands in the two polar regimes. Under the Friedman rule,
in panel (a), output per island is independent of the aggregate shock, since the expected income
eﬀect is absent. In the fully constrained regime, in panel (b), the output of each island θ is
greater after a high aggregate shock.15
We can then perform some simple comparative statics exercises. In particular, we look at
15To make the ﬁgure easier to read, we consider here a bigger aggregate shock, which reduces the probability
of θ =0by 0.09 (which generates a 10% output response in the Friedman rule regime).


























Figure 3: Island-speciﬁc output and local productivity shocks
the eﬀect of changing σ1 and σ2 on equilibrium volatility. Figure 4 shows the proportional
output response for diﬀerent values of these parameters, plotted against the nominal interest
rate i. Panel (a) shows that economies with σ1 closer to 1, display smaller aggregate volatility.
To understand the mechanism behind this ﬁgure, notice that the coeﬃcient σ1 determines
the elasticity of demand for local goods in island θ.W h e n σ1 is closer to 1,d i ﬀerences in
productivity θ have a smaller eﬀect on nominal income, p1(θ)y1(θ), since changes in output
are compensated by close to proportional changes in prices.16 This reduces nominal income
volatility across islands, dampening the strength of the expected income eﬀect. The eﬀects of
changing σ2 are shown in panel (b). Increasing agents’ risk aversion in period 2 strengthens
the agents’ self-insurance motive, thus magnifying the expected income eﬀect. Therefore, for
higher values of σ2, the ampliﬁcation is more pronounced.17
As a further exercise, let us relax the assumption that the distribution of θ has positive
mass at zero. That assumption was made to ensure that money holdings are always positive
at the end of period 1, m1(θ) > 0 for all θ, so that we could focus our attention on the role of





,w i t hθ > 0. The equilibrium characterization for this general case is discussed
in Appendix B. In particular, suppose θ is still a discrete uniform (with 10 realizations), but
16The presence of a positive mass of islands with θ =0 , means that some degree of income volatility is present
even in the limit case σ1 =1 .
17The example with σ2 =2shows that the assumption σ2 ≤ 1 is not necessary for our ampliﬁcation result.
In fact, ampliﬁcation is stronger for larger values of σ2.
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Figure 4: Comparative statics: the output response for diﬀerent values of σ1 and σ2
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Figure 5: Output response with binding liquidity constraints in period 1
θ =0 .25. The remaining parameters and the form of the aggregate shock are unchanged.
Figure 5 plots the output response to a positive aggregate shock in this case. Ampliﬁcation
is still present for all i>0. The possibility of a binding liquidity constraint in period 1
generates an interesting non-monotonicity in the relation between the monetary regime and
output volatility. For low levels of i, the liquidity constraint in period 1 is not binding, and
our eﬀect generates ampliﬁcation as in the benchmark case. However, when i is high enough,
around 12%,t h ep e r i o d1 liquidity constraint starts to bind for consumers in islands with high
productivity. This dampens the response of consumption, since some consumers are eﬀectively
against a cash-in-advance constraint, reducing the ampliﬁcation eﬀect. As in the baseline
model, there is a cutoﬀ ˆ ı, around 65%, above which changes in i have no further eﬀect on the
real allocation. At this point, there is still a sizable degree of ampliﬁcation.18
5.3 Countercyclical liquidity premia
Next, let us look at the response of the liquidity premium to aggregate shocks. Our numerical
example shows an interesting additional implication of the model: the same mechanism behind
18In the example presented, for i ≥ ˆ ı, 40% of the consumers are constrained in period 1. It is also possible
to construct examples where, for suﬃciently high values of i, all consumers are constrained in period 1.I nt h a t
case, the ampliﬁcation eﬀect disappears as i becomes high enough.
24the ampliﬁcation result tends to make the liquidity premium countercyclical.
Let us go back to the extended version of the model presented in Section 3.3, where we
introduced an illiquid asset, in zero net supply. Let us assume that the illiquid asset is traded
after the realization of ζ.19 Therefore, the price of the illiquid asset is a function of ζ.B y














Consider ﬁrst an unconstrained economy. An immediate extension of equation (8) shows that
q(ζ)=1 , as in the case of no aggregate shocks. Therefore, the liquidity premium is zero and is
independent of ζ. In a fully constrained economy, combining the consumers’ Euler equations













This implies that the liquidity premium 1/q (ζ) − 1 is always positive and, in general, varies
with ζ. It is interesting to explore whether we can say anything about the correlation of the
liquidity premium and the aggregate shock.
Figure 6 plots the liquidity premium conditional on the two aggregate shocks, for diﬀerent
values of i, and shows that the liquidity premium is countercyclical in our example.20 To
understand the underlying mechanism, notice that the liquidity premium is countercyclical

































When ζ increases, there are two eﬀects on the liquidity premium, related to the two eﬀects
on aggregate output analyzed in Section 4. On the one hand, there is an “own-productivity
eﬀect,” represented by the ﬁrst term of (28), that tends to increase the liquidity premium.
If there are more islands with higher productivity, there will be more trade on average and
19It is easy to show that if we allow agents to trade the illiquid asset before the realization of ζ its price would
be equal to βR.
20As for Figure 3, we consider here a larger aggregate shock (which reduces the probability of θ =0by 0.09),
to make the ﬁgure easier to read.































Figure 6: Liquidity premium
agents will need more liquid assets. On the other hand, there is an “expected income” eﬀect,
represented by the second term of (28). In a given island θ, consumers expect higher income
and reduce their demand for liquidity. This increases consumption and reduces their marginal
utility in period 1, driving down the liquidity premium. Notice that the prices p1(θ,ζ) are
also adjusting when ζ changes, which makes it hard to derive unambiguous analytical results.
However, for all the parameter combinations we have tried, this second eﬀect is positive. In
Figure 6, this eﬀect is illustrated by the dotted line labeled “expected income eﬀect,” and is
suﬃciently strong so as to generate a countercyclical liquidity premium.
6E x t e n s i o n s
6.1 News shocks
Consider now an economy where the aggregate shock ζ is not observed by the households in
period 1. Instead, they all observe a public signal ξ ∈ [ξ,ξ], which is drawn at the beginning
of each period, together with the aggregate shock ζ, from a continuous distribution with joint
density function g (ζ,ξ).
Take an agent located in an island with productivity θ, his posterior density regarding ζ




ζ f(θ|˜ ζ)g(˜ ζ,ξ)d˜ ζ
.
The distribution g (ζ|ξ,θ) is then used to derive the agent’s posterior beliefs regarding ˜ θ in the





We will make the assumption that F(˜ θ|ξ,θ) is non-decreasing in ξ, for any pair (θ,˜ θ).T h i s
means, that conditional on θ, the signal ξ is “good news” for ˜ θ, in the sense of Milgrom (1981).
We also make the natural assumption that F(˜ θ|ξ,θ) is non-decreasing in θ.I n p e r i o d 2,t h e
actual shock ζ is publicly revealed.
In this environment, we study a stationary equilibrium, along the lines of Deﬁnition 1, where
the distribution of money holdings at the beginning of period 1 is degenerate and prices and
allocations depend on idiosyncratic shocks and on the aggregate shocks ξ and ζ. In particular,
prices and quantities in period 1, p1 (θ,ξ) and y1 (θ,ξ), depend only on θ and ξ,g i v e nt h a tζ





y1 (θ,ξ)dF (θ|ζ). (29)
We can now look separately at the output response to the productivity shock ζ and to the
news shock ξ. In particular, next proposition shows that the output response to ζ is positive
both in an unconstrained and in a fully constrained equilibrium, while the output response to
the signal ξ is positive only in the fully constrained case.21
Proposition 5 Consider the economy with imperfect information regarding the aggregate shock.
In an unconstrained equilibrium ∂Y1(ζ,ξ)/∂ζ > 0 and ∂Y1(ζ,ξ)/∂ξ =0 . In a fully constrained
equilibrium ∂Y1(ζ,ξ)/∂ζ > 0 and ∂Y1(ζ,ξ)/∂ξ > 0.
This result is not surprising, in light of the analysis in the previous section. Compare
the expression for aggregate output under imperfect information (29) with the correspondent
expression in the case of full information (21). By deﬁnition, the productivity shock ζ aﬀects
21The analysis in Appendix B can be easily extended to the case of the economy with aggregate shocks and
imperfect information.
27the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks F(·|ζ) in both cases. However, the trading decisions
in island θ are aﬀected only by the agents’ expectations about that distribution, which, in
the case of imperfect information, are driven by the signal ξ. It follows that the eﬀect of ζ
is analogous to the own-productivity eﬀect, while the eﬀect of ξ is analogous to the expected
income eﬀect. The advantage of an environment with imperfect information, is that these two
eﬀects can be disentangled. In particular, our ampliﬁcation mechanism is captured by the
output response to ξ. When liquidity is abundant, as we know from Proposition 1, output in
island θ is independent of the economy-wide distribution of productivity and does not respond
to ξ. The result that the output response to ξ is positive when liquidity is scarce is a natural
extension of Proposition 4. In island θ, trading is higher the more optimistic agents are about
trading in all other islands. The only diﬀerence is how expectations are formed. The perceived
distribution of productivities for an agent in island θ depends now on the signal ξ,i n s t e a d
that on the actual ζ. A positive signal ξ makes both consumers and producers in island θ
more optimistic about trading in other islands, even if the underlying ζ is unchanged. This
highlights that expectations are at the core of our ampliﬁcation result.
6.2 Alternative sources of liquidity
There are several alternative ways of introducing a liquid asset in our environment, which lead
to formally equivalent models. A sketch of these diﬀerent approaches can help the interpreta-
tion of our results.
Constant money growth. Assume that money pays no interest, and there is a constant
money growth rate γ,t h a ti s ,
Mt+1 = γMt.
Monetary injections take place at the end of period 3, and the government budget constraint
is now
Mt+1 = Mt − Tt,
where the lump-sum tax/subsidy Tt is time-varying. It is possible to prove that this economy
is formally equivalent, in real terms, to our baseline economy. More speciﬁcally, given an
equilibrium of the economy with interest-bearing notes, there exists an economy with constant
money growth that achieves the same equilibrium allocation in real terms. The converse also
applies. The argument for this result goes as follows. Take an equilibrium of the baseline
28economy, with rate of return R, and equilibrium prices p1(θ),p 2,p 3. In an economy with
constant money growth γ = R−1, we can construct an equilibrium with an identical allocation
in terms of consumption and labor supply, where the prices are time-varying and equal to
˜ p1,t (θ)=γtp1 (θ), ˜ p2,t = γtp2, and ˜ p3,t = γtp3. In Appendix C, we provide further details on
how this equilibrium is constructed. Here, we just remark that the inﬂation rate between any
pair of periods (s,t) and (s,t +1 )is equal to γ, so that the real rate of return on money is
equal to 1/γ and thus, by construction, to R.
Lucas trees. Consider an economy with a ﬁxed endowment of “trees,” as in Lucas (1978),
paying a constant real dividend d>0 in every period 3. The total supply of trees is normalized
to 1. In this case, we can derive an equivalence result with the baseline economy by restricting
R to the interval (0,1/β]. Consider an equilibrium of the economy with interest-bearing notes.
Then, there is an equivalent Lucas tree economy where d is equal to the real value of the
tax in period 3, T/p3, and the household’s endowment in period 3 is equal to e3 − d.I n
the corresponding equilibrium, consumption and labor supply are identical and the price of
trees in terms of consumption goods are given by Q1(θ)=M/p1(θ), Q2 = M/p2 and Q3 =







which, by construction, is equal to R. Appendix C describes in detail the equilibrium allocation.
In the Lucas tree version of our model, the analogues of Propositions 2 and 3 can be stated
as follows.
Proposition 6 In the Lucas tree economy, there exist two cutoﬀs dC and dU,w i t hdC <d U,
such that if d ≥ dU there exists an unconstrained equilibrium and if d ≤ dC there exists a fully
constrained equilibrium.
This result gives an additional reason for labeling our two polar cases as “abundant” and
“scarce” liquidity. The unconstrained equilibrium arises when the supply of the real asset,
captured by the dividend d, is large, and the fully constrained equilibrium arises in the opposite
case. Notice that, given the model parameters, it is possible that dC ≤ 0. In this case, no
Lucas tree economy achieves a fully constrained equilibrium, given that d>0. Whether dC is
positive or negative depends on whether ˆ R is greater or smaller than 1, and, in general, both
cases are possible.
29There is a common element among the various approaches considered: the real value of
the ﬂow of transfers associated to the liquid asset in period 3. In our baseline economy, this
corresponds to the net interest payments on the net money balances (R − 1)(M − T)/p3,
which, by the government budget constraint, is equal to T/p3. In the constant money growth
economy, this is equal to Tt/˜ p3,t and, in the Lucas tree economy, it corresponds to d.G i v e n
that local markets are Walrasian, the essential distortion in our economy is the limited ability
of agents to do intertemporal trade. A consumer meeting a producer in periods 1 or 2 would be
willing to transfer future resources in period 3 in exchange for current consumption. However,
as credit contracts are not available, he is not able to promise repayment. The presence of the
liquid asset allows him to circumvent this problem, since he can transfer his asset holdings to
the producer. The equilibrium value of the liquid asset depends on the value of the real payoﬀs
associated to it. The larger this payoﬀ, the larger the equilibrium value of the asset.22
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed how diﬀerent liquidity/monetary regimes aﬀect the response of
an economy to aggregate shocks. When liquid assets are scarce and agents are more likely to be
liquidity constrained, the response of the economy is magniﬁed. In this case, a complementarity
in agents’ trading decisions arises endogenously and ampliﬁes the initial eﬀect of the shock.
Our mechanism is driven by the combination of risk aversion, idiosyncratic uncertainty,
and decentralized trade. All three ingredients are necessary for the mechanism to operate.
Risk aversion and idiosyncratic risk give rise to an insurance problem. Decentralized trade,
together with the anonymity assumption, implies that agents can only self-insure using their
money holdings.23 A nice feature of our setup is that simply by changing the real rate of return
on money, we move from an environment in which idiosyncratic risk is perfectly insurable
(Friedman rule) to an environment in which idiosyncratic risk is completely uninsurable (fully
constrained regime). In this sense, the mechanism identiﬁed in this paper speaks more broadly
about the eﬀects of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk on aggregate behavior.
If we interpret our liquid asset strictly as a monetary instrument, as we did in our quantita-
tive examples of Section 5, an immediate implication of our model is that high inﬂation regimes
22The idea that public liquidity allows consumers to overcome lack of commitment in ﬁnancial contracts is
explored in Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
23Reed and Waller (2006) also point out the risk sharing implications of diﬀerent monetary regimes in a model
àl aLagos and Wright (2005).
30tend to exhibit higher real volatility. Looking at the empirical relation between inﬂation rates
and aggregate volatility, across countries and across time, it is indeed possible to ﬁnd a positive
correlation. Even though it is clearly hard to establish the direction of causality, this corre-
lation is consistent with our mechanism. Our results also show that high inﬂation is socially
costly because it undermines the role of monetary savings as a form of self-insurance. From
this point of view, the policy implications of our model are straightforward. Implementing the
Friedman rule is optimal and, as a side product, delivers lower aggregate volatility. Notice that
this result relies on the availability of lump-sum taxes. The study of optimal monetary policy
with distortionary taxation in our setup remains a topic for future research.24
Under a broader interpretation of liquid assets, our paper is related to the literature on the
aggregate implications of imperfect risk sharing. This literature has focused on the eﬀects of
imperfect risk sharing for capital accumulation, asset prices, and the welfare cost of business
cycles. Our result points to a potential eﬀect on the response of output to aggregate shocks.
It would be interesting to explore the presence and quantitative signiﬁcance of our mechanism
in a Bewley (1977) type economy with aggregate shocks, such as the one studied in Krusell
and Smith (1989).25
Finally, the coordination mechanism identiﬁed in our model could have relevant implica-
tions for the study of ﬁnancial markets. In particular, one could replace the trading of goods
in our model with trading of risky ﬁnancial assets, as in recent search models of ﬁnancial
transactions, such as Duﬃe, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2006).
This approach could be used to study the behavior of liquidity premia and trading volumes in
periods of ﬁnancial turmoil.
24Aruoba and Chugh (2006) show that, with distortionary taxation, the Friedman rule is not optimal in a
model àl aLagos and Wright (2005).
25In Krusell and Smith (1989) the entire capital stock of the economy is a liquid asset and the presence of
uninsurable idiosyncratic risk has minor eﬀects on aggregate dynamics. To explore our mechanism, it would be
interesting to assume that only a fraction of capital income is liquid.
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A. Proofs for Section 3
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
For each θ>0 we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions
u0(c1(˜ θ,θ))f (θ)=λ1 (θ),
v0(n(θ,˜ θ))f (θ)=θλ1 (θ),
where λ1 (θ) is the Lagrange multipliers for the resource constraints in island θ. These conditions show
that the optimal c1(˜ θ,θ) and n(θ,˜ θ) are independent of ˜ θ. Then, by market clearing c1(˜ θ,θ)=y1(θ,˜ θ)
for all ˜ θ, and we denote this quantity yFB
1 (θ).L e tnFB(θ) denote n(θ,˜ θ). Then, the resource constraint
in island θ becomes yFB
1 (θ)=θnFB(θ). Combining it with the ﬁrst order conditions above gives (1).
Moreover, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to c2(θ,˜ θ) gives U0(c2(θ,˜ θ)) = λ2, which implies that
c2 is constant across households. The resource constraint in period 2 requires c2(θ,˜ θ)=e2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
The ﬁrst part is an immediate corollary of Proposition 1. The second part follows from applying the
implicit function theorem to the planner’s optimality condition
θu0(yFB
1 (θ)) = v0(yFB
1 (θ)/θ).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We proved in the text that βR =1is a necessary condition for the existence of an unconstrained equi-
librium. Suﬃciency will be proved as the last step. First, we prove that any unconstrained equilibrium
achieves a ﬁrst-best allocation. Since (4) holds as an equality for all (θ,˜ θ), it follows that c2(θ,˜ θ) is
constant. Then, market clearing requires that c2(θ,˜ θ) be equal to e2 for all (θ,˜ θ). Substituting in (3)








These two conditions, and market clearing in island θ,i m p l yt h a t
θu0(y1(θ)) = v0 (n(θ)),
where y1(θ)=θn(θ), which corresponds to the planner optimality condition (1). Therefore, labor
supply and consumption in periods 1 and 2 are ﬁrst-best eﬃcient. Since any consumption allocation in
period 3 is consistent with ﬁrst-best eﬃciency, this completes the argument.
Next, we prove that equilibrium prices must take the form (9)-(11), with κ ≤ ˆ κ. The consumers’
ﬁrst order conditions immediately imply that (9)-(11) must hold for some κ>0. To show that κ
is smaller than a cutoﬀ ˆ κ and to derive the value of the cutoﬀ, we need to complete the equilibrium
characterization, by deriving consumption in period 3 and money holdings. Substituting the prices (9)-
(11) and ﬁrst-best consumption in periods 1 and 2 in the consumer’s budget constraints, and imposing
the stationarity conditions m = M and m3(θ,˜ θ)=M/R,w eo b t a i n
m1(˜ θ)=M − κu0(yFB
1 (˜ θ))yFB
1 (˜ θ), (30)
m2(θ,˜ θ)=m1(˜ θ)+κu0(yFB
1 (θ))yFB
1 (θ) − κU0 (e2)e2, (31)
M/R = m2(θ,˜ θ)+κU0 (e2)e2 + κ(e3 − c3(θ,˜ θ)) − T. (32)
32For each pair (θ,˜ θ), conditions (30)-(32), together with the government budget constraint, can be solved
to derive m1(˜ θ), m2(θ,˜ θ) and c3(θ,˜ θ). In particular, we obtain





which is independent of κ and strictly positive, given our assumption that e3 is large. It remains to




















Lemma 1 together with the assumption cu00 (c)/u0 (c) ≤ 1 guarantees that u0(yFB
1 (θ))yFB
1 (θ) is increas-
ing in θ.N o t i c et h a tyFB
1 (0) = 0 and p1 (0) = κu0(yFB
1 (0)) = ∞,s op1 (0)yFB
1 (0) is not well deﬁned. We
adopt the natural convention that p1(0)yFB
1 (0) = 0. It follows that a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for (34) and (35) is κ ≤ ˆ κ where ˆ κ is deﬁn e di n( 1 2 ) .
Finally, we prove that the condition R =1 /β is suﬃcient for an unconstrained equilibrium to exist.
To do so, we construct an equilibrium with prices (9)-(11). From the argument above, we know that
labor supply and consumption in periods 1 and 2 must be at their ﬁrst-best level, and consumption in
period 3 must be equal to (33). Choosing any κ ≤ ˆ κ ensures that money holdings are non-negative.
It is straightforward to check that this allocation satisﬁes market clearing and that it is individually
optimal, given that it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions (3)-(6).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1
The statement follows immediately from the condition κ ≤ ˆ κ,t h ed e ﬁnition of ˆ κ (12) and the pricing
condition (10).
Preliminary Results for Proposition 3
In order to prove Proposition 3, it is useful to prove several preliminary lemmas. These results will also
be useful to prove Proposition 4.
The following lemmas allow us to establish that the system of functional equations (18)-(19) has a
unique solution, (p1(·),y 1(·)).T od os o ,w ed e ﬁne a ﬁxed point problem for the function x(·). Recall
from the text that x(θ) ≡ p1(θ)y1(θ). To save on notation, in the lemmas we drop the period index and
use p(θ) and y(θ).
N o t i c et h a t ,i na ni s l a n dw h e r eθ =0 , output is zero and, from condition (18), the price p(0) may
be inﬁnity. Hence, nominal income in island 0 may be not well deﬁned. The natural solution is to
set x(0) = 0. Moreover, non-negativity of consumption in period 2 requires that x(θ) ≤ e2 for all θ.




→ [0,e 2] that
satisfy x(0) = 0, which we denote by X.
Lemma 4 Given θ>0 and a function x ∈ X, there exists a unique pair (p,y) which solves the system
of equations





e2 − py + x(˜ θ)
´










e2 − x(˜ θ)+py
´
dF(˜ θ)=0 . (37)
The pair (p,y) satisﬁes py ∈ [0,e 2].
33Proof. We proceed in two steps, ﬁrst we prove existence, then uniqueness.
Step 1. Existence. For a given p ∈ (0,∞), it is easy to show that there is a unique y which solves
(36) and a unique y which solves (37), which we denote, respectively, by yD(p) and yS (p).F i n d i n ga
solution to (36)-(37), is equivalent to ﬁnding a p that solves
yD (p) − yS (p)=0 . (38)
It is straightforward to prove that yD (p) and yS (p) are continuous on (0,∞).W e n o w p r o v e t h a t
they satisfy four properties: (a) pyD(p) <e 2 for all p ∈ (0,∞),( b )yS (p) <θ ¯ n for all p ∈ (0,∞),
(c) limsupp→0 yD (p)=∞,a n d( d )limsupp→∞ pyS (p)=∞.N o t i c e t h a t x(0) = 0 with positive
probability, so the Inada condition for U can be used to prove property (a). Similarly, to prove
property (b), we can use the assumption limn→¯ n v0 (n)=∞. To prove (c) notice that (a) implies
limsupp→0 pyD (p) ≤ e2.I flimsupp→0 pyD (p)=e2, then, we immediately have limsupp→0 yD (p)=∞.
If, instead, limsupp→0 pyD (p) <e 2, then there exists a K ∈ (0,e 2) and an  >0 such that pyD (p) <K
for all p ∈ (0, ).S i n c e U0 is decreasing, this implies that U0
³
e2 − pyD (p)+x(˜ θ)
´
is bounded above








e2 − pyD (p)+x(˜ θ)
´
dF(˜ θ)=0 .
Using (36), this requires limp→0 u0 ¡
yD (p)
¢
=0and, hence, limp→0 yD (p)=∞.T op r o v ep r o p e r t y( d ) ,
suppose, by contradiction, that there exist a K>0 and a P>0, such that pyS(p) ≤ K for all p ≥ P.
Then U0
³
e2 − x(˜ θ)+pyS (p)
´







e2 − x(˜ θ)+pyS (p)
´
dF(˜ θ)=∞. (39)






Using equation (37), conditions (39) and (40) lead to a contradiction, completing the proof of (d).
Properties (a) and (d) immediately imply limsupp→∞
¡
pyS (p) − pyD (p)
¢
= ∞, while (b) and (c)
imply limsupp→0
¡
yD (p) − yS (p)
¢
= ∞. It follows that there exists a pair (p0,p 00),w i t hp0 <p 00,s u c h
that yD (p0) − yS (p0) > 0 and yD (p00) − yS (p00) < 0. By the intermediate value theorem there exists a
p which solves (38). Property (a) immediately implies that py ∈ [0,e 2],w h e r ey = yD(p)=yS(p).
Step 2. Uniqueness. Let ˆ p b eaz e r oo f( 3 8 ) ,a n dˆ y = yD(ˆ p)=yS(ˆ p). To show uniqueness, it is




























































































dF(˜ θ)(u0 (ˆ y)+ˆ yu00(ˆ y)) > 0.
The ﬁrst two terms on the left-hand side are positive. The assumption that u0 has elasticity smaller
than or equal to 1 implies that also the last term is positive, completing the argument.
Lemma 5 Given a function x ∈ X,f o ra n yθ>0 let (p(θ),y(θ)) b et h eu n i q u ep a i rs o l v i n gt h es y s t e m
(36)-(37) and deﬁne z (θ) ≡ p(θ)y(θ).T h ef u n c t i o nz (θ) is monotone increasing.
Proof. Deﬁne the two functions





e2 − z + x(˜ θ)
´
dF(˜ θ),










e2 − x(˜ θ)+z
´
dF(˜ θ),
which correspond to the left-hand sides of (36) and (37) multiplied, respectively, by y and y/θ. Lemma
4 ensures that for each θ>0 there is a unique positive pair (z (θ),y(θ)) which satisﬁes
h1 (z (θ),y(θ);θ)=0 ,
h2 (z (θ),y(θ);θ)=0 .

















To prove the lemma it is suﬃcient to show that z0 (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0,θ].U s i n gz and yas shorthand



























































The assumption that u0 has elasticity smaller than 1 ensures that both numerator and denominator are
negative, completing the proof.
We can now deﬁne a map T from the space X into itself.
Deﬁnition 2 Given a function x ∈ X,f o ra n yθ>0 let (p(θ),y(θ)) be the unique pair solving the
system (36)-(37). Deﬁne a map T : X → X as follows. Set (Tx)(θ)=p(θ)y(θ) if θ>0 and
(Tx)(θ)=0if θ =0 .
35The following lemmas prove monotonicity and discounting for the map T. These properties will be
used to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point of T. In turns, this ﬁxed point will be used to construct the equilibrium in
Proposition 3.






(θ) for all θ.




and α ∈ [0,1],d e ﬁne
x(˜ θ,α) ≡ x0(˜ θ)+α∆(˜ θ),
where ∆(˜ θ) ≡ x1(˜ θ)−x0(˜ θ) ≥ 0.N o t i c et h a tx(˜ θ,0) = x0(˜ θ) and x(˜ θ,1) = x1(˜ θ).F i xav a l u ef o rθ and
deﬁne the two functions





e2 − z + x(˜ θ,α)
´
dF(˜ θ),










e2 − x(˜ θ,α)+z
´
dF(˜ θ).
Applying Lemma 4, for each α ∈ [0,1] we can ﬁnd a unique positive pair (z (α),y(α)) that satisﬁes
h1 (z (α),y(α);α)=0 ,
h2 (z (α),y(α);α)=0 .
We are abusing notation in the deﬁnition of h1 (·,·;α),h 2 (·,·;α),z(α), and y(α), given that the same
symbols were used above to deﬁne functions of θ. Here we keep θ constant throughout the proof,







Therefore, to prove our statement it is suﬃcient to show that z0 (α) ≥ 0 for all α ∈ [0,1].












































e2 − z + x(˜ θ,α)
´
∆(˜ θ)dF(˜ θ).
The denominator takes a form analogous to (42). Again, the assumption that u0 has elasticity smaller
than 1, ensures that both the numerator and the denominator are negative, completing the argument.
Before proving the discounting property, it is convenient to restrict the space X to the space ˜ X of
functions bounded in [0,z] for an appropriate z<e 2. The following lemma shows that the map T maps
˜ X into itself, and that any ﬁxed point of T in X must lie in ˜ X.
Lemma 7 There exists a z<e 2,s u c ht h a ti fx ∈ X then (Tx)(θ) ≤ z for all θ.
36Proof. Set x(0) = 0 and x(θ)=e2 for all θ>0.S e t t i n g x(.)=x(.) and θ = θ,e q u a t i o n s
(36)-(37) take the form




= θp[F (0)U0 (e2 + py)+( 1− F (0))U0 (py)].
Let (ˆ p, ˆ y) denote the pair solving these equations, and let z ≡ ˆ pˆ y.S i n c eF (0) > 0 and U satisﬁes the
Inada condition, limc→0 U0 (c)=∞, inspecting the ﬁrst equation shows that z<e 2.N o w t a k e a n y
x ∈ X.S i n c e x(θ) ≤ x(θ) for all θ,L e m m a6i m p l i e st h a t(Tx)(θ) ≤ (Tx)(θ). Moreover, Lemma 5




= z. Combining these inequalities we obtain (Tx)(θ) ≤ z.
Lemma 8 There exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such that the map T satisﬁes the discounting property: for any












Proof. Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 6, deﬁne
x(˜ θ,α) ≡ x0(˜ θ)+α∆(˜ θ),






























































Now, given that z (α) and x(˜ θ,α) are both in [0,z] and z<e 2, and given that U has continuous ﬁrst
and second derivatives on (0,∞), it follows that both A and B are bounded above. We can then ﬁnd a
uniform upper bound on both A and B, independent of α and of the functions x0 and x1 chosen. Let























nv00 (n)/v0 (n) − yu00(y)/u0(y)
(2 + nv00 (n)/v0 (n))C
¶−1
a.
Recall that σ > 0 is a lower bound for −yu00(y)/u0(y).T h e n
nv00 (n)/v0 (n) − yu00(y)/u0(y)














z0 (α) ≤ δa







(θ)=z (0), completing the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
We ﬁrst uniquely characterize prices and allocations in a fully constrained equilibrium. Next, we will
use this characterization to prove our claim. The argument in the text and the preliminary results
above show that if there exists an equilibrium with m2(θ,˜ θ)=0for all θ and ˜ θ,t h e np1(θ) and y1(θ)
must solve the functional equations (18)-(19). To ﬁnd the equilibrium pair (p1 (θ),y 1 (θ)) we ﬁrst ﬁnd
a ﬁxed point of the map T deﬁned above (Deﬁnition 2). Lemmas 6 and 8 show that T is a map
from a space of bounded functions into itself and satisﬁes the assumptions of Blackwell’s theorem.
Therefore, a ﬁxed point exists and is unique. Let x denote the ﬁx e dp o i n t ,t h e nL e m m a4s h o w st h a t
we can ﬁnd two functions p1 (θ) and y1 (θ) that satisfy (36)-(37). Since x(θ) is a ﬁxed point of T we
have x(θ)=p1 (θ)y1 (θ), and substituting in (36)-(37) shows that (18)-(19) are satisﬁed. Therefore,
in a fully constrained equilibrium p1 (θ) and y1 (θ) are uniquely determined, and so is labor supply
n(θ)=y1(θ)/θ. Moreover, from the budget constraint and the market clearing condition in period 2,
consumption in period 2 is uniquely determined by c2(θ,˜ θ)=e2 − p1(˜ θ)y1(˜ θ)+p1 (θ)y1 (θ). The price
p2 is equal to 1, as argued in the text. From the consumer’s budget constraint in period 3 and the
government budget constraint we obtain c3 = e3. Combining the Euler equations (3) and (5) and the








U0(c2(θ,˜ θ))dF(θ)dF(˜ θ). (45)









0 U0(c2(θ,˜ θ))dF(θ)dF(˜ θ)
.
The only optimality condition that remains to be checked is the Euler equation in period 2,( 4 ) .G i v e n
the deﬁnition of c2(θ,˜ θ), Lemma 5 implies that it is an increasing function of θ and a decreasing function





Substituting the expression (45) for 1/p3 on the right-hand side, this condition is equivalent to R ≤ ˆ R.
Therefore, if an unconstrained equilibrium exists, since c2(θ,˜ θ) is uniquely determined, condition (46)
implies that R ≤ ˆ R, proving necessity. If R ≤ ˆ R, the previous steps show how to construct a fully
constrained equilibrium, proving suﬃciency.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
The second part of the Lemma follows immediately from Lemma 5. For the ﬁrst part, we start from
t h es a m ef u n c t i o n sh1 (z,y;θ) and h2 (z,y;θ) deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 5 and apply the implicit

















38To complete the proof of the lemma it is suﬃcient to show that y0 (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0,θ].U s i n gz and
































showing that it is negative. Finally, the denominator is equal to (42) and is negative as we have argued
in the proof of Lemma 5, completing the argument.
B. Derivations and proofs for Sections 4 and 5
Equilibrium with aggregate shocks
General characterization. In a stationary equilibrium with aggregate shocks the optimality condi-
























U0(c2(θ,˜ θ,ζ))dF(˜ θ|ζ) for all θ,ζ, (51)
where (50) is derived by substituting the envelope condition (7) in the analog of (5). Notice that
condition (50) shows that, with i.i.d. shocks, p3 is independent of the aggregate shock ζ. An equilibrium
is given by prices and allocations that satisfy (51) to (50), together with the market clearing conditions
and the budget constraints:
m1(˜ θ,ζ)+p1(˜ θ,ζ)c1(˜ θ,ζ)=M,
m2(θ,˜ θ,ζ)+p2 (ζ)c2(θ,˜ θ,ζ)=m1(˜ θ,ζ)+p1 (θ,ζ)y1 (θ,ζ),
M/R+ p3c3(θ,˜ θ,ζ)=p3e3 + m2(θ,˜ θ,ζ)+p2 (ζ)e2 − T.
To compute an equilibrium it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd prices and quantities solving the system formed
by (51), the market clearing condition c1(θ,ζ)=θn(θ,ζ) for all θ,ζ,a n de q u a t i o n s















































39This system is written in general form, allowing for cases where the constraints m1(θ,ζ) ≥ 0 and
m2(θ,˜ θ,ζ) ≥ 0 are binding only for a subset of, respectively, Θ and Θ2. Therefore, we can use it
to compute equilibria for: (i) economies with R ∈ ( ˆ R,1/β) where the liquidity constraint in period
2 is non-binding for some pairs (θ,˜ θ), and (ii) economies where the assumption F (0) > 0 is relaxed,
allowing for a binding liquidity constraint in period 1 for some θ. This system is used to compute all
the equilibria in Section 5.
Unconstrained and fully constrained equilibria. The characterization of an unconstrained
equilibrium is straightforward, thanks to Lemma 1, which shows that the ﬁrst-best allocation in period
1 is independent of the distribution F(·|ζ). Let us discuss the construction of a fully constrained
equilibrium for the economy with aggregate shocks (under the usual assumption F (0|ζ) > 0). Now,
a fully constrained equilibrium is one where m2(θ,˜ θ,ζ)=0for all θ,˜ θ and ζ . In such an equilibrium
p2 (ζ) is independent of ζ and equal to M/e2, as in the case of no aggregate shocks. Therefore, we can
deﬁne a system of functional equations analogous to (18)-(19), for each ζ. Proceeding as in the proof of
Proposition 3, we can then ﬁnd equilibrium functions p1(·,ζ) and y1(·,ζ) for each value of ζ separately.













0 U0(c2(θ,˜ θ,ζ))dF(θ)dF(˜ θ)dG(ζ)
,
where c2(θ,˜ θ,ζ)=e2 − p1(˜ θ,ζ)y1(˜ θ,ζ)+p1(θ,ζ)y(θ,ζ).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
The proof proceeds in three steps. The ﬁrst two steps prove that, for each θ, the nominal income in
island θ is increasing with the aggregate shock ζ,t h a ti s ,x(θ,ζ) is increasing in ζ,w h e r ex(θ,ζ) ≡
p1(θ,ζ)y1(θ,ζ). Using this result, the third step shows that y1 (θ,ζ) is increasing in ζ.C o n s i d e r t w o
values ζ
I and ζ
II,w i t hζ
II >ζ
I. Denote, respectively, by TI and TII the maps deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2
under the distributions F (θ|ζI) and F (θ|ζII).L e txI and xII be the ﬁxed points of TI and TII.T h a t
is, xI(θ) ≡ x(θ,ζ
I) and xII(θ) ≡ x(θ,ζ
II) for all θ. Again, to save on notation, we drop the period
index for y1.
Step 1. Let the function x0 be deﬁned as x0 = TIIxI. In this step, we want to prove that
x0 (θ) >x I (θ) for all θ>0.W ew i l lp r o v ei tp o i n t w i s ef o re a c hθ.F i xθ>0 and deﬁne the functions
h1 (z,y;ζ) ≡ yu0(y) − z
Z θ
0
U0(e2 − z + xI(˜ θ))dF(˜ θ|ζ),








U0(e2 − xI(˜ θ)+z)dF(˜ θ|ζ),
for ζ ∈ [ζ
I,ζ
II]. Lemma 4 implies that we can ﬁnd a unique pair (z (ζ),y(ζ)) that satisﬁes
h1 (z (ζ),y(ζ);ζ)=0 ,
h2 (z (ζ),y(ζ);ζ)=0 .
Once more, we are abusing notation in the deﬁnition of h1 (·,·;ζ),h 2 (·,·;ζ),z(ζ), and y(ζ). However,
as θ is kept constant, there is no room for confusion. Notice that z(ζ
I)=xI (θ),s i n c exI is a ﬁxed
point of TI,a n dz(ζ
II)=x0 (θ), by construction. Therefore, to prove our statement we need to show
that z(ζ
II) >z (ζ
I).I ti ss u ﬃcient to show that z0 (ζ) > 0 for all ζ ∈ [ζ
I,ζ


















40Notice that xI(˜ θ) is monotone increasing in ˜ θ, by Lemma 5, and U is strictly concave. Therefore,
U0(e2−z+xI(˜ θ)) is decreasing in ˜ θ and U0(e2−xI(˜ θ)+z) is increasing in ˜ θ. By the properties of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance,
R θ
0 U0(e2 −z +xI(˜ θ))dF(˜ θ|ζ) is decreasing in ζ and
R θ
0 U0(e2 −xI(˜ θ)+z)dF(˜ θ|ζ)
is increasing in ζ.T h i si m p l i e st h a t∂h1/∂ζ > 0 and ∂h2/∂ζ < 0.U s i n gy as shorthand for y(ζ),t h e




















The denominator is the analogue of (42). Once more, the assumption that yu00 (y)/u0 (y) ≥− 1 ensures
that both numerator and denominator are negative, completing the argument.
Step 2. Deﬁne the sequence of functions (x0,x 1,...) in X, using the recursion xj+1 = TIIxj. Since,
by step 1, x0 ≥ xI (where by x0 ≥ xI we mean x0 (θ) ≥ xI (θ) for all θ>0) and, by Lemma 6, TII
is a monotone operator, it follows that this sequence is monotone, with xj+1 ≥ xj.M o r e o v e r ,TII is a
contraction by Lemmas 6 and 8, so this sequence has a limit point, which coincides with the ﬁxed point
xII. T h i si m p l i e st h a txII ≥ x0 and, together with the result in step 1, shows that xII >x I,a sw e
wanted to prove.
Step 3. Fix θ>0 and, with the usual abuse of notation, deﬁne the functions
h1 (z,y;ζ) ≡ yu0(y) − z
Z θ
0
U0(e2 − z + x(˜ θ,ζ))dF(˜ θ|ζ),








U0(e2 − x(˜ θ,ζ)+z)dF(˜ θ|ζ).
Notice the diﬀerence with the deﬁnitions of h1 and h2 in step 1, now x(˜ θ,ζ) replaces xI(˜ θ).T h e























U0(e2 − z + x(˜ θ,ζ))dF(˜ θ|ζ)+z
Z θ
0






U0(e2 − x(˜ θ,ζ)+z)dF(˜ θ|ζ) − z
Z θ
0





U0(e2 − x(˜ θ,ζ)+z)+( e2 − x(˜ θ,ζ)+z)U00(e2 − x(˜ θ,ζ)+z)
i
dF(˜ θ|ζ) ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that U0 has elasticity less than or equal to 1 (this






U00(e2 − z + x(˜ θ,ζ))
∂x(˜ θ,ζ)
∂ζ
dF(˜ θ|ζ) − z
Z θ
0




where the ﬁrst element is positive from steps 1 and 2, and the second element is positive because ζ leads

















41Putting together the four inequalities just derived shows that the numerator is negative. The denomi-
nator takes the usual form, analogous to (42), and is negative. This completes the proof.
C. Results and proofs for Section 6
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5


















In the case of an unconstrained equilibrium, with R =1 /β, the analogue of Proposition 2 can
be easily derived, showing that ∂y1(θ,ξ)/∂ξ =0and ∂y1(θ,ξ)/∂θ > 0. These properties imply that
∂Y1(ζ,ξ)/∂ζ > 0 and ∂Y1(ζ,ξ)/∂ξ =0 .
Consider a fully constrained equilibrium, with R< ˆ R.F o r e a c h v a l u e o f ξ, the functions p1(θ,ξ)
and y1(θ,ξ) can be derived solving the following system of functional equations, analogous to (23)-(24):
u0(y1(θ,ξ)) = p1 (θ,ξ)
Z θ
0









U0(e2 − p1(˜ θ,ξ)y1(˜ θ,ξ)+p1 (θ,ξ)y1 (θ,ξ))dF(˜ θ|ξ,θ).
The only formal diﬀerence between these and (23)-(24) is that the distribution F(˜ θ|ξ,θ) depends also
on θ.H o w e v e r ,t h i sd o e sn o ta ﬀect any of the steps of Proposition 3 (there is only a minor diﬀerence
in the proof of the analogue of Lemma 5, details available on request). Therefore, this system has a
unique solution for each ξ. Next, following the steps of Lemma 2 and Proposition 4, we can show that
y1(θ,ξ) is increasing in θ and ξ.T h i si m p l i e st h a t∂Y1(ζ,ξ)/∂ζ > 0 and ∂Y1(ζ,ξ)/∂ξ > 0.
Mapping with alternative models of liquidity supply
Constant money growth. Let p1 (θ),p 2,p 3, m1(θ),m 2(θ,˜ θ),m 3(θ,˜ θ),a n dc1(θ),c 2(θ,˜ θ),c 3(θ,˜ θ) be
prices, money balances, and consumption levels in a stationary equilibrium of the economy with interest-
bearing notes. To construct the corresponding equilibrium of the constant money growth economy, let
M0 = M, γ = R−1 and Tt = T/γt. As in the text, set the prices
˜ p1,t (θ)=γtp1 (θ),
˜ ps,t = γtps, for s =2 ,3.
Take the same consumption functions of the economy with interest-bearing notes and set the money
balance functions as follows
˜ m1,t(θ)=γtm1(θ), ˜ m2,t(θ,˜ θ)=γtm2(θ,˜ θ), ˜ m3,t(θ,˜ θ)=Mt+1.
The household’s budget constraints, for a household beginning with Mt on date t,a r en o w
˜ m1,t(˜ θ)+˜ p1,t(˜ θ)c1(˜ θ)=Mt,
˜ m2,t(θ,˜ θ)+˜ p2,tc2(θ,˜ θ)=˜ m1,t(˜ θ)+˜ p1,t (θ)y1(θ),
˜ m3,t(θ,˜ θ)+˜ p3,tc3(θ,˜ θ)=˜ p3,ty3 +˜ m2,t(θ,˜ θ)+˜ p2,ty2 − Tt.
42Some algebra shows that they are satisﬁed. Moreover, all intertemporal prices are unchanged, as












Substituting these prices in the household’s ﬁrst order conditions shows that the allocation is individually
optimal, completing the equilibrium construction.


















,h 3(θ,˜ θ)=1 .
The household’s budget constraints, for a household beginning with 1 unit of the real asset on date t,
are:
Q1(˜ θ)h1(˜ θ)+c1(˜ θ)=Q1(˜ θ),
Q2h2(θ,˜ θ)+c2(θ,˜ θ)=Q2h1(˜ θ)+Q2 (y1(θ)/Q1(θ)),
Q3h3(θ,˜ θ)+˜ c3(θ,˜ θ)=e3 − d +( Q3 + d)(h2(θ,˜ θ)+e2/Q2).
Some algebra shows that these constraints are satisﬁed. Moreover, it can be checked that all the
household optimality conditions are satisﬁed, given that all intertemporal prices are unchanged.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
To prove these two results, we exploit the mapping between the baseline economy and the Lucas tree
economy derived above. Consider the baseline economy with interest-bearing notes. Let ˆ κ be deﬁned
as in Proposition 2, for a given value of T. Proposition 2 ensures that for any κ ≤ ˆ κ there exists an





Then, for any d ≥ dU,w ec a nﬁnd the correspondent unconstrained equilibrium in a Lucas tree economy
with d = T/κ.
For the second part, recall that Proposition 3 ensures that we can ﬁnd a fully constrained equilibrium
of the baseline economy for any R ≤ ˆ R. In that case, using (45) and the normalization M = e2,r e a l










U0(c2(θ,˜ θ))dF (θ)dF(˜ θ).
Notice that φ is a constant which is equal in all fully constrained equilibria (in particular, it is indepen-
dent of R). Using the government budget constraint, this implies that for each R ≤ ˆ R the equilibrium
real value of the tax T is given by T/p3 =( R − 1)φe2.D e ﬁne
dC ≡ ( ˆ R − 1)φe2.
For any d ≤ dC,w ec a nﬁnd the correspondent fully constrained equilibrium in a Lucas tree economy,
with d =( R − 1)φe2.
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